UTP » Chapter 8

Chapter 8: Dividing the State: Federalism and Other Options

Chapter Summary Self-Study Questions Something to Consider Key Terms Case Studies Resources

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter explores the variety of ways in which the state may exist at more than one level. Decentralization may be purely administrative or reflect a constitutionally protected autonomy between levels of state. The latter distinction informs a discussion of the differences between confederal, federal, and unitary states. Although confederal states no longer exist except in the abstract, it is possible to consider constitutions (such as the original US Constitution) in which the component units (e.g., states, provinces) control the central government. More commonly, both the central state and the component sub-national units are assigned specific constitutional powers, and neither can dissolve the other without its consent—these are examples of federations or federal states.

The primary consideration in federal states is the balance of powers between the two levels of state. This is often approached in terms of the authority to legislate, but there are important administrative and fiscal considerations as well. In Germany, for example, all laws are administered at the state level. Some constitutions, such as Canada’s, limit the revenue capacity of the sub-national units of the state, a consideration that may lead to fiscal imbalances. Such imbalances may exist at two levels: between the central and the sub-national units, and between one sub-national unit and another. In the latter case it is expected that the central government may make up some of the difference.

In addition, without fail, federal states possess a bicameral legislature in which the representation by population that characterizes the lower house is balanced by representation of sub-national units. In some regimes, such as the United States, the representation is equal—each sub-national unit elects the same number of representatives; in others, such as Austria or Germany, there are different levels of representation that reflect population disparities among the sub-national units. It is also important, if both levels of state are to be autonomous, that a constitutional amending formula prescribes the levels of support necessary from each level of state for any proposal to go forward.

Finally, several options for decentralizing power within a unitary state are examined, ranging from quasi-federal Spain, in which sub-national units have their own levels of jurisdiction; to devolution in the United Kingdom, providing the Scots, the Welsh, and the Northern Irish with their own assemblies and constitutional powers; to the departments of the French Republic, administrative subdivisions exercising powers assigned (to each) by the National Assembly.

SELF-STUDY QUESTIONS

Multiple Choice

(Answer key below)

1. Which of the following offers an early example of the exercise of sovereignty over a large territory?

a. Greece
b. Rome
c. Mexico
d. All of the above

2. Which of the following regions have devolved powers?

a. Catalonia
b. Northern Ireland
c. Scotland
d. All of the above

3. The need to recognize regional differences in a federal state can lead to which of the following?

a. Asymmetric federalism
b. Bicameralism
c. Both
d. Neither

4. A horizontal fiscal imbalance indicates different revenue-generating ability between which of the following?

a. National and regional governments
b. Regional and local governments
c. National and local governments
d. Various regional governments

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Short Answer

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SOMETHING TO CONSIDER

1. All US state legislatures (except Nebraska’s) are bicameral; all of Canada’s provincial legislatures are unicameral. Which has it right?

2. It often seems that Canadian voters prefer their prime minister and their provincial premier to come from different parties. What are the pros and cons of such an outcome?

3. Would an elected Senate pose more of a challenge to Canada’s prime minister or to the provincial premiers?

4. Each “E”—elected, equal, effective—in the triple-E proposal for Senate reform poses practical problems. Which is most easily solved?

KEY TERMS

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CASE STUDIES

Strategy and Polls in the French Presidential Election

The 2002 French Presidential election produced a quite unexpected result in the first round, when Jean-Marie Le Pen of the far-right National Front finished in second place with 16.86 per cent of the vote, ahead of Socialist Party candidate Lionel Jospin (with 16.18 per cent). Not only was the substantial proportion of France’s population that supports parties on the left deprived of a candidate in the second round, first-place finisher Jacques Chirac faced a candidate with little potential for increasing his support in the second round. The resulting landslide for Chirac—82.21 per cent to Le Pen’s 17.89 per cent—confirmed this. Three other aspects of this contest stand out.

First, polls had consistently shown Jospin in second place, with a margin over Le Pen of at least 4 per cent in every poll. The actual result led many to question the accuracy of the polling industry in France. (On the other hand, changes in the way people live today have recently diminished the accuracy of public opinion polls in many different regimes.)

Second, the votes cast for presidential candidates of four parties whose alliances and partnerships with the Socialist Party make it likely that their voters would have supported Jospin in the second round totalled 16.27 per cent in the first round—more than Jospin polled himself. A small shift in support from any of these parties (none of which could have had a realistic expectation that their candidate would survive to the second round) to Jospin, could have put Jospin ahead of Le Pen. The use of two rounds of voting in France may create an incentive for voters to support the candidate of their first choice in the initial round even though their vote will ultimately go elsewhere in the second round. In this case, the strategy backfired, and no viable candidate remained for the voters on the left.

Third, some evidence suggests that many French voters defer voting until the second round, especially if there is a general consensus (created, in part, by public-opinion polling) about what the first round will produce. In this case as well, for French supporters of the left in 2002, such an approach did not pay off.

RESOURCES

Chapter References

Australian Commonwealth Grants Commission. “The Australian framework for federal financial relations,” 2010–11 Update Report. Web.

Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.

Mahler, Gregory S. Comparative Politics: An Institutional and Cross-National Approach. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995.

Mény, Yves. Government and Politics in Western Europe. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database. Web. Electronic Copy

Russell, Meg. “Resolving Disputes between the Chambers,” Paper to Royal Commission, The Constitution Unit, University College London, 1999. Web. Electronic Copy

Steiner, Jürg. European Democracies. 3rd ed. New York: Longman, 1995.

Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union. 3rd ed. Toronto: Gage, 1989.

Wheare, K.C. Federal Government. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Other Resources

Federal Elements of Canadian Constitution